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DETERMINING LEGAL CUSTODY IN A DIVORCE
PROCEEDING: WHEN THE HEALTH OF A CHILD
HINGES ON THEIR PARENTS’ RELIGION*
In the last two decades, married couples have become more racially
and ethnically diverse than ever.1 The United States Census Bureau
has reported that from 2000 to 2012–2016, the percentage of interracial or interethnic married-couple households grew from 7.4 to 10.2
percent.2 As a result, more couples who practice two different religions are getting married and having children who grow up in households with direct exposure to both religions. However, these couples
are not immune to the divorce rate and as a result, every aspect of
their lives may suddenly be subject to the scrutiny of the judicial
system.
When two parents are involved in a divorce proceeding, the parties
seldom anticipate a court to control medical procedures of their child.
Even more surprising is when a court is able exercise this control by
using the parents’ religions as a justification. While courts are often
reluctant to factor a parent’s religion into the “best interests” standard
for child custody determinations, certain narrow circumstances may
warrant such an inquiry.
The central argument of this Article is that a court is permitted to
inquire into the religions of two parents in a divorce proceeding to
determine the best interests of a child when one parent’s religion supports vaccinations and the other parent’s religion opposes vaccinations. Such an inquiry not only withstands the First Amendment but
finds further support from the state’s police power and the state’s role
as parens patriae. Part I of this Article provides a background on compulsory vaccination requirements and the best interests standard that
courts use during a divorce proceeding. Part II of this Article examines why a court’s inquiry into the religion of parents to determine the
best interests of a child is sound, discussing the relationship between a
parent’s fundamental right to raise their child as they see fit and the
* Gabrielle N. Kahn, J.D., DePaul University College of Law, 2021. I would like to extend
my sincerest thanks to the DePaul Law Review Volume 70 Executive Board, as well as Michele
Jochner, who believed in me and my writing from day one.
1. Brittany Rico et al., Growth in Interracial and Interethnic Married-Couple Households, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU (July 9, 2018), https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2018/07/interracial-marri
ages.html.
2. Id.
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state’s interest as parens patriae. Part III argues that courts should
grant legal custody to the parent who supports vaccinations and analyzes the impact of such a choice, in addition to the impact of the
alternative. Part IV concludes that awarding legal custody to the parent who supports vaccinations is the best possible outcome in order to
maintain public health and safety.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Compulsory Vaccination Requirements
1. Vaccinations
Vaccinations are defined as the “medical process by which an agent
similar to the disease or virus being prevented is deliberately introduced into a non-exposed individual, thereby causing the body to produce antibodies against the underlying illness.”3 Numerous public
health studies conclude that comprehensive vaccination policies are
“greatly responsible for the significant reduction, and sometimes complete eradication, of many childhood diseases,” and others have said
that “childhood vaccinations are the most effective public-health measure in American history.”4 Since the United States began to realize
the benefits of vaccinations throughout the nineteenth century,5 and
full-scale immunization efforts spread throughout the twentieth century, “[n]ew and improved vaccines have been developed at an unprecedented rate in the last few decades, and the trend continues to
the present day.”6
Generally speaking, risk versus risk analysis indicates that receiving
a vaccination is approximately one thousand times safer than not receiving a vaccination and risking exposure to the disease.7 One thousand times safer is on the lower end of the spectrum; some studies
indicate that it could be up to one hundred thousand times safer to
receive a vaccine than it is to risk contracting a life-threatening
disease.8
Today, all states have their own series of compulsory and recommended vaccines.9 All states require evidence of vaccination against
3. Steve P. Calandrillo, Vanishing Vaccinations: Why Are So Many Americans Opting Out of
Vaccinating Their Children?, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 353, 362 (2004).
4. Alicia Novak, The Religious and Philosophical Exemptions to State-Compelled Vaccination:
Constitutional and Other Challenges, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1101, 1121–22 (2005).
5. Calandrillo, supra note 3, at 365.
6. Id. at 368.
7. Id. at 391.
8. Id. at 393.
9. Id. at 383.
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“diphtheria, measles, rubella[,] and polio (at minimum) . . .” for school
entrance.10 This movement began in the 1960s, when data showed that
states with mandatory measles vaccination requirements had 40% to
51% lower rates of the disease than did states without such regulations.11 These compulsory school vaccination requirements did not
force children to get vaccinated.12 Rather, the requirements merely
prevented unvaccinated children from enrolling in public school.13
However, under certain circumstances, parents can opt their children
out from the vaccination requirement while their children are nonetheless permitted to enroll in public school.14
2. Herd Immunity
Compulsory school vaccination requirements “have been required
for years and are associated with successful reduction of infectious disease and establishment of herd immunity, which occurs when a threshold of vaccinated individuals is reached so that others may not need to
be vaccinated to maintain a population of healthy individuals.”15
When the majority of a population is properly immunized against a
certain disease or diseases, the “herd immunity” serves as a “protective barrier against the spread of infection to others in the group who
are not immunized . . .” due to exemptions or age.16
An important aspect of herd immunity is that it can occur even
when less than one hundred percent of the population is vaccinated.17
However, herd immunity’s most significant downfall is that a sufficiently high proportion of the population must be immunized so that
transmission of the disease can be interrupted.18 Therefore, problems
arise when individuals justify not receiving vaccinations by relying on
the rest of the “herd” to keep them safe.
This scenario is a classic collective action problem: “increasing numbers of free-riders undermine society’s ability to achieve a critical
mass of people who are vaccinated.”19 When too many individuals
rely on the rest of the herd to be immunized, their lives are not the
10. Id.
11. Calandrillo, supra note 3, at 382; see Kathryn M. Edwards, Editorial, State Mandates and
Childhood Immunization, 284 JAMA 3171, 3172 (2000).
12. Hope Lu, Giving Families Their Best Shot: A Law-Medicine Perspective on the Right to
Religious Exemptions from Mandatory Vaccination, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 869, 875 (2013).
13. Id.
14. See infra Part I.A.5; Novak, supra note 4, at 1101.
15. Lu, supra note 12, at 874–75.
16. Calandrillo, supra note 3, at 420.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 361.
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only ones endangered.20 Risk of exposure increases, and diseases can
spread to individuals with weakened immune systems, children who
are too young to receive vaccinations,21 and even individuals who
have already been vaccinated.22 The community protection provided
by herd immunity becomes meaningless when too many individuals
try to “free ride” off of the obliging population.23 Herd immunity is a
driving force behind compulsory vaccination requirements; requiring
the entire population to receive vaccines ensures that herd immunity
will be maintained, providing protection to all individuals in the community and thereby serving the wider public good.24
3. The Rise of the Anti-Vaccination Movement
Vaccines have become a victim of their success.25 Because mass immunizations have eradicated debilitating illnesses, or have made them
incredibly rare, today’s generation no longer fears the diseases that
vaccines are designed to prevent.26 Since these diseases are no longer
killing off large populations in the United States, the focus has shifted
to the risks that immunizations present.27 Instead of focusing on the
health achievements provided by immunizations, attention is directed
toward vaccine-related injuries due to “their rarity and ability to
shock parents and catch viewers’ attention.”28 Today, individuals are
overreacting to high tragedy events with relatively low probability,
while simultaneously underperceiving the risk of death from diseases
that vaccines were intended to eradicate.29 Of course, news stories
about one child—out of millions—dying after receiving one vaccine
are far more alarming to parents than news stories about diseases that
have killed millions of individuals.30
The anti-vaccinationists’ movement is further fueled by distrust of
government31 and perceived threats to freedom and individualism.32
Public health authorities are often characterized as “abusive, untrust20. Id. at 419.
21. Novak, supra note 4, at 1122.
22. Id. at 1123.
23. Calandrillo, supra note 3, at 420.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 419.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 388–89.
28. Id. at 404.
29. See Yvonne A. Maldonado, Current Controversies in Vaccination: Vaccine Safety, 288
JAMA 3155, 3156 (2002).
30. Calandrillo, supra note 3, at 405.
31. Id. at 397.
32. Id. at 393.
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worthy, and paternalistic[,]” while the resistance was “equated with
fighting government oppression.”33 Individuals and groups opposing
government interference in their personal lives argue that no one has
the ability to control what they do with their body—or their child’s
body—and the state especially may not control their decisions.34 Thus,
compulsory vaccination requirements are inexcusable obtrusions on
basic human autonomy and liberty.35
The Internet, providing hundreds of websites spreading misinformation about vaccines, exacerbates this opposition.36 In 2003, Robert
Wolfe published an account of the content contained on a dozen antivaccination websites, with a majority stating that vaccine immunity is
temporary, that homeopathy is a viable alternative, and even that diseases have declined without the assistance of vaccinations.37 The websites also included “[a]necdotal, emotionally charged stories of
children who had allegedly been killed or harmed by vaccines . . .”38
The use of personal stories and heartbreaking photographs encourage
false consensus bias.39 The number of anti-vaccinationists websites
spouting such disinformation have undoubtedly increased since 2003,
but the claims contained on the websites continue to be circulated
without being peer-reviewed in published medical literature.40
4. The Constitutionality of Compulsory Vaccination Requirements
Although states are charged with creating their own laws mandating
immunization, the United States Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of state vaccination laws on numerous occasions.41 Beginning in 1905, in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court held
that municipalities are authorized to require immunizations without
violating one’s constitutional liberty rights.42 In 1922, the Court extended its holding from Jacobson in Zucht v. King and upheld a local
33. James G. Hodge, Jr. & Lawrence O. Gostin, School Vaccination Requirements: Historical,
Social, and Legal Perspectives, 90 KY. L.J. 831, 849 (2001–02).
34. Calandrillo, supra note 3, at 393.
35. Id.
36. See generally Robert M. Wolfe et al., Content and Design Attributes of Antivaccination
Web Sites, 287 JAMA 3245 (2002).
37. See id. at 3247 (stating that homeopathy can help fight against diseases in the same way
that vaccines can).
38. Calandrillo, supra note 3, at 403.
39. See id. False consensus bias is defined as the tendency to rely on personal experience
rather than systematic, scientific evidence.
40. See Wolfe et al., supra note 36, at 3247.
41. Daniel A. Salmon & Andrew W. Siegel, Religious and Philosophical Exemptions from
Vaccination Requirements and Lessons Learned from Conscientious Objectors from Conscription, 116 PUB. HEALTH REPS. 289, 290 (2001).
42. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25–30 (1905).
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government mandate that required vaccination as a prerequisite for
enrolling in school, holding that state officials had “broad discretion in
matters affecting the application and enforcement of a health law.”43
Following the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Jacobson and Zucht, several state courts have ruled that “antivaccinationists’ arguments concerning the right to public education (absent government
interference) do not prevent legislatures from imposing reasonable
immunization laws on their citizens.”44
Compulsory vaccination requirements are constitutional under the
state’s police power, whereby states have a compelling interest in preserving public health and safety.45 The Institute of Medicine defines
public health as “what we, as a society, do collectively to assure the
conditions for people to be healthy.”46 As laws relating to the public
health and welfare, state vaccination laws fall under the state’s police
power, making them completely state-based.47 In creating state vaccination laws, a state is charged with balancing public health welfare
with a parent’s individual right to raise their child as they see fit.48
The Supreme Court has emphasized the state’s police power to require vaccinations for the benefit of overall public safety, holding that
“important individual liberty rights (to opt out from vaccines) do not
override other people’s rights (to communal health safety).”49 In
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the Court ruled that “the police power of a
State must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations
established directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public
health and the public safety.”50 Thus, the Court has made it clear that
the state may in fact infringe upon individual rights when the health
concerns of the larger community are at stake.51
Further, compulsory vaccination requirements do not violate the
First Amendment. The religion clauses of the First Amendment state
that “Congress shall make no law [1] respecting an establishment of
43. Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176 (1922); see Novak, supra note 4, at 1105; Lu, supra note
12, at 876.
44. Calandrillo, supra note 3, at 394–95; see Maricopa Cty. Health Dep’t v. Harmon, 750 P.2d
1364, 1369 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the state health department did not violate unvaccinated children’s rights when excluding them from school).
45. Novak, supra note 4, at 1121.
46. Lu, supra note 12, at 872.
47. See Salmon & Siegel, supra note 41, at 294.
48. See Calandrillo, supra note 3, at 356.
49. Id. at 358.
50. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905).
51. See generally id.
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religion or [2] prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”52 The first clause,
often referred to as the Establishment Clause, ensures that “[n]either
a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.”53 The second clause, often referred to as the Free
Exercise Clause, provides the “right to religious beliefs, including assembling for worship services, proselytizing, and observing dietary restrictions . . .”54 Thus, the Free Exercise Clause affords constitutional
protection to beliefs, but not necessarily actions motivated by those
beliefs.55
When determining whether a statute is constitutional, courts must
conduct a balancing test and analyze whether the state has a compelling interest that is promoted by the statute’s religious eligibility provisions and justifies substantially infringing on someone’s First
Amendment rights.56 When looking at compulsory vaccination requirements, the Supreme Court has weighed the balance in favor of
public health concerns when in conflict with religious beliefs.57 In
Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause
does not give a parent the right to expose their child or the community
to harm from disease.58 States have followed the Supreme Court’s
holding. In Wright v. DeWitt School District, the Supreme Court of
Arkansas held that a compulsory vaccination law with no religious exemption is constitutional because the right of free exercise is subject
to reasonable regulation for the good of the community as a whole.59
The Mississippi Supreme Court has also ruled in the interest of public
health, holding that a state has an “‘overriding and compelling public
interest’ to protect children from harm, even when such rights conflict[ ] with the religious rights of the parents seeking exemptions for
their children.”60
52. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Fourteenth Amendment has made the First Amendment applicable to the states. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
53. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
54. Joanne Ross Wilder, Resolving Religious Disputes in Custody Cases: It’s Really Not About
Best Interests, 22 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 411, 412 (2009) [hereinafter Wilder, It’s Really Not
About Best Interests].
55. Joanne Ross Wilder, Religion and Best Interests in Custody Cases, 18 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 211, 220 (2002) [hereinafter Wilder, Religion and Best Interests].
56. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399–400 (1963).
57. Salmon & Siegel, supra note 41, at 291.
58. 321 U.S. 158, 167–70 (1944).
59. 385 S.W.2d 644, 648 (Ark. 1965).
60. Ross D. Silverman, No More Kidding Around: Restructuring Non-Medical Childhood Immunization Exemptions to Ensure Public Health Protection, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 277, 283
(2003) (citing Brown v. Stone, 378 So. 2d 218, 222 (Miss. 1979)).
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5. Exemptions to Compulsory Vaccination Requirements
While all fifty states have enacted compulsory vaccination statutes,
almost all states have provided the opportunity for parents to claim
some sort of exemption to those statutes.61 There are three types of
exemptions: medical exemptions, religious exemptions, and philosophical exemptions, sometimes called personal belief exemptions.
a. Three Types of Exemptions
All fifty states allow parents to claim medical exemptions.62 Most
often, parents claim a medical exemption for their child when the
child is “immuno-compromised, suffer[s] from certain forms of cancer,
or [is] allergic to vaccines[.]”63 When verified by a physician as legitimately indicated, medical exemptions make the most sense.64 Thus,
when a child would suffer more harm than good as a result of vaccinations because of his compromised health situation, clearly he should
not be vaccinated.65
Religious exemptions differ from medical exemptions in that they
“do not present a medically necessary reason for abandoning vaccination.”66 Courts have held that a parent’s reason for seeking the exemption must be based on religious grounds, rather than mere secular
grounds.67 However, courts have limited themselves on how far they
are willing to inquire into someone’s religious beliefs, looking at the
sincerity of the person’s belief, rather than the truth of that belief.68
Courts have determined that “[a]n inquiry into the sincerity of a person’s religious belief is constitutionally permissible, but subjecting the
belief to scrutiny to determine the truth of the belief is not because
people can sincerely believe religious principles that are not necessarily true.”69
The last type of exemption is a philosophical exemption. It should
be noted that very few states still have philosophical exemptions, as
61. States With Religious and Philosophical Exemptions From School Immunization Requirements, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGS. (Apr. 30, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/school-immunization-exemption-state-laws.aspx (“All 50 states have legislation requiring specified
vaccines for students. Although exemptions vary from state to state, all school immunization
laws grant exemptions to children for medical reasons.”).
62. See Alan R. Hinman et al., Childhood Immunization: Laws that Work, 30 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 122, 124 (2002).
63. Calandrillo, supra note 3, at 413.
64. Id.
65. See id.
66. Id.
67. Mason v. Gen. Brown Cent. Sch. District, 851 F.2d 47, 53 (2d Cir. 1988).
68. Lu, supra note 12, at 877.
69. Wilder, Religion and Best Interests, supra note 55, at 224.
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many states have removed the exemption entirely. However, for the
states that still employ philosophical exemptions, parents may claim
these exemptions for “moral, philosophical[,] or other personal beliefs.”70 These statutes usually require that the parents’ beliefs be exercised in good faith or sincerely held, but these requirements are
enforced infrequently.71
b. Negativity Surrounding Religious Exemptions
The recent rise of religious and philosophical exemptions has
sparked concern, especially within the medical community. In fact, the
American Medical Association has gone on record opposing both religious and philosophical exemptions.72 The most popular organized
religious sects objecting to mandatory vaccinations include the Amish,
Mennonite, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Christian Scientists, among
others.73 Unfortunately, almost all major outbreaks occurring in the
United States in the last twenty-five years have been tied to communities of those denominations.74 Diseases that were believed to be completely eradicated have suddenly resurged, prompting skepticism into
the true benefit of religious exemptions. Specifically, religious exemptions have been criticized in two major ways. First, the ease of obtaining religious exemptions in some states have made those
exemptions prone to abuse. Second, the number of parents claiming
religious exemptions for their children has had a significant impact on
herd immunity.
Religious exemptions have been characterized as “anyone who
wants it, gets it[.]”75 This is because there is little oversight with regard
to who is claiming these exemptions.76 In some states, the only thing a
parent has to do to receive a religious exemption is simply assert that
vaccines are contrary to their religious beliefs.77 Thus, someone with
even the slightest desire to claim a religious exemption can do so with-

70. See Hodge & Gostin, supra note 33, at 869 tbl.2, 873.
71. See id. at 873.
72. See Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Worship Optional: Joining a Church To Avoid Vaccines, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 14, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/14/science/worship-optional-joining-achurch-to-avoid-vaccines.html.
73. Lu, supra note 12, at 877.
74. Calandrillo, supra note 3, at 415.
75. See McNeil, supra note 72.
76. Novak, supra note 4, at 1124.
77. See Lu, supra note 12, at 870.
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out much thought.78 Conversely, some states demand more proof of
sincerity for a parent claiming a religious exemption.79
Because exemptions are state-based,80 the ease of obtaining religious exemptions vary from state to state. Numerous studies have
linked the ease in obtaining exemptions to the number of parents
claiming exemptions for their children. Predictably, the complexity of
each state’s exemption is directly correlated to the percentage of parents who choose to legally opt their children out of vaccinations.81 In
fact, one study found that of the nineteen states with “the highest level
of complexity required to receive an exemption,” none of those states
had more than one percent of children exempted from compulsory
vaccination laws.82 The ease by which a parent may obtain a religious
exemption for their child thus threatens to undermine compulsory
vaccination laws’ intent.83
More crucially, studies have proven a direct link between children
who are exempted and children who are at risk of contracting these
serious, life-threatening diseases that vaccinations were intended to
eradicate.84 A national seven-year study showed that school-aged children who claimed a religious or philosophical exemption were thirtyfive times “more likely to contract measles” than children who were
vaccinated.85 The likelihood that exempted children could contract
one of these serious, life-threatening diseases are even greater in hot
spots,86 where a community faces a cluster problem. Clustering—
when those who apply for the exemptions live in clusters in relatively
close proximity to one another—is a frequent issue with religious exemptors, as they cluster around a school or church.87 For example,
78. Salmon & Siegel, supra note 41, at 293.
79. For example, in order to receive a medical exemption, Nebraska schools require parents
to submit “an affidavit signed by a legally authorized representative stating that the immunization conflicts with the tenets and practices of a recognized religious denomination of which the
student is a member.” See Aleksandra Sandstrom, Amid measles outbreak, New York closes
religious exemption for vaccinations – but most states retain it, PEW RES. (June 28, 2019), https://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/28/nearly-all-states-allow-religious-exemptions-for-vaccinations/.
80. See supra Part I.A.4.
81. Calandrillo, supra note 3, at 434.
82. Id. at 434–35.
83. Id. at 418.
84. See id. at 435.
85. Daniel A. Salmon et al., Health Consequences of Religious and Philosophical Exemptions
From Immunization Laws: Individual and Societal Risk of Measles, 282 JAMA 47, 47 (1999).
86. National immunization rates appear to be high overall. However, hot spots occur in local
communities where “disease pockets” spring up, where significant percentages of populations
remain unvaccinated. See Calandrillo, supra note 3, at 421–22.
87. Novak, supra note 4, at 1122–23.
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clusters have been found in Vashon Island, Washington and Boulder,
Colorado, both of which have encountered outbreaks of illnesses that
could have been prevented by vaccinations.88 Because these clusters
contain large numbers of individuals claiming exemptions, herd immunity is compromised.89
With studies finding a link between the ease of obtaining a religious
exemption and the number of exemptions claimed, as well as a link
between exempted children and children who are at risk of contracting diseases that vaccinations were created to guard against, it is
clear why so many critics believe that the rise of exemptions threatens
to undermine the public health achievements made possible by compulsory vaccination laws.90 However, because religious exemptions
“reflect a political and judicial attempt to reconcile competing personal and public interests[,]” states will likely continue to offer religious exemptions.91 Nevertheless, states maintain the authority to
impinge on a parent’s right to religious freedom and override a parent’s religious practice when the welfare of innocent parties is at
stake.92
B. The Best Interests of the Child
When two parents go through a divorce proceeding, some state
courts are required to assign decision-making responsibilities to one
or both parents.93 In deciding whether to assign those decision-making
responsibilities to one parent or both parents equally, the courts must
consider “the ability of the parents to cooperate and make joint decisions.”94 If parents are able to agree and make decisions together for
their child in an amicable fashion, joint custody will be awarded. Conversely, if two parents are unable to make joint decisions relating to
their child’s upbringing, one parent will be awarded sole legal cus-

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
See supra Part I.A.2.
See Calandrillo, supra note 3, at 421.
Id. at 412.
See id. at 432.
Wilder, It’s Really Not About Best Interests, supra note 54, at 414.
Id.
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tody.95 The court will determine which parent is awarded sole legal
custody based on the best interests of the child.96
1. The “Best Interests” Standard
The majority of states have enacted statutes setting forth the proposition that custody decisions are made in accordance with the best
interests of the child.97 Further, each state legislature has set forth best
interests criteria for determining which parent should make major decisions for the child.98 While the best interests standard is the paramount concern when parents engage in a custody dispute,99 the legal
definition of “best interests” has perplexed scholars, attorneys, and
even judges. This is because the court is most often attempting to determine whose rights—those of the children or the parents—should
be of paramount consideration.100
While courts attempt to delineate the best interests of the child, the
court is simultaneously treading lightly so as to not interfere in a parent’s constitutional right to raise their child how they see fit.101 While
95. Legal custody is distinct from physical custody. Legal custody grants a parent authority to
make important, long-term decisions regarding their child. In contrast, physical custody refers to
where the child lives after the parents are divorced. While the common scenario is for both
parents to have joint legal and physical custody, it is possible that one parent may be awarded
sole legal custody or sole physical custody. The result of sole legal custody is one parent having
the final decision-making authority relating to the health, education, and welfare of his or her
children. On the other hand, the result of sole physical custody is one parent exercising the
majority of parenting time while the other parent is granted “visitation,” which is a regularly
scheduled time that is less than the custodial parent’s parenting time.
96. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-3-1 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c) (2017); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 25-403.01(B) (2013); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-13-101(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2019); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 14-10-123(1.5)(b) (2019); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-56(b) (2014); D.C. CODE § 16914(a)(1)(A) (2021); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-3(a)(2) (2021); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46(a)(1)
(2013); IDAHO CODE § 32-717(1) (2007); IOWA CODE § 598.41 (2019); KAN STAT. ANN. § 233203(a)(6) (2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(2) (West 2021); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208
§ 28 (2019); MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (2015); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24 (2003); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 452.375(2) (2018); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364(1)(b) (2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9(A)
(1977); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1)(a) (McKinney 2020); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(a) (2017);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2 (2019); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 3109.04 (LexisNexis 2011);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 109(A) (2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105(1)(b) (2014); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 25-4-45 (1994); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 36-6-106 (2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665(b)
(2018); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2(B) (2018); WASH. REV. CODE 26.10.100 (2021); W. VA. CODE
§ 48-9-101 (2001); WIS. STAT. § 767.41(2) (2021); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-201 (2018).
97. Id.
98. Cynthia R. Mabry, Blending Cultures and Religions: Effects that the Changing Makeup of
Families in our Nation Have on Child Custody Determinations, 26 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 31,
31 (2013).
99. See id.
100. Erin Bajackson, Best Interests of the Child – A Legislative Journey Still in Motion, 25 J.
AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 311, 311 (2013).
101. Mabry, supra note 98, at 31.
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parents are presumed to act in the best interest of their children,
“[t]he reality is that the best interests of the child [can be] subordinated to overarching public policy considerations[,]” resulting in the
welfare of that individual child being sacrificed to a greater good.102
2. A Parent’s Fundamental Right to Raise Their Child
The Supreme Court has recognized that parents have a constitutionally protected, fundamental right to raise their child as they see fit,
including making decisions regarding the custody, control, and care of
their child.103 Included in this decision-making is the right to direct the
religious upbringing of their children, protected by the parents’ own
freedom of religion.104 That right is not forfeited just because parents
are involved in a divorce proceeding.
While a state court has the ability to designate one parent as the
custodial parent in a divorce proceeding, both parents retain the fundamental right to make their own decisions relating to their child, and
unless a showing of harm to the child can be made, the court is in no
position to substitute its judgment for the parents’ judgment on the
ground that a different choice might be better.105 In fact, even when
there is a primary custodial parent and a secondary custodial parent,
both parents retain the right to expose the child to each parent’s religion.106 The difference in religious exposure between a primary and
secondary custodial parent is that the primary custodial parent determines the child’s religion and what faith the child will be raised in,
while the secondary custodial parent may expose the children to his or
her religion, but does not have a right to “enroll the child in classes or
102. Wilder, Religion and Best Interests, supra note 55, at 216.
103. See id. at 220; Wilder, It’s Really Not About Best Interests, supra note 54, at 413; see
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (“In subsequent cases also, we have recognized the
fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their
children.”); see Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (“It is plain that the interest of a
parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children ‘come[s] to
this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive
merely from shifting economic arrangements.’ ”); see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232
(1972) (“The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental
concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of parents in the
upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.”); see Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (“We have recognized on numerous
occasions that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected.”); see
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (“Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western
civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children.
Our cases have consistently followed that course[.]”).
104. Wilder, Religion and Best Interests, supra note 55, at 220.
105. Id. at 221.
106. See Wilder, It’s Really Not About Best Interests, supra note 54, at 418.
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programs in a religion different from that chosen for the child” by the
primary custodial parent.107 Regardless of their custodial status, both
parents’ right to control their child’s religious training is subject to
limitation upon a showing of substantial harm to the child.108
3. The State’s Parens Patriae Power
The limitation on a parent’s fundamental right to raise their child
how they see fit arises out of the state’s interest as parens patriae.109
The Supreme Court has found that a state has a “compelling” interest
in “safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor[.]”110 In other words, “the state has a compelling interest in protecting children from harm.”111 Thus, if a parent’s actions cause
“actual or threatened harm to a child[,]” a compelling interest sufficient to permit state interference with that parent’s rights has been
established.112 However, courts may not rely on the legislature’s best
interests standard absent a substantial harm to the child; such a standard is insufficient to find that a parent’s fundamental rights have
been subordinated to a compelling state interest.113 In other words,
without a finding of substantial harm to the child, a court’s finding of
best interests does not constitutionally support a custody decision that
transgresses a parent’s fundamental right of religion or right to raise
their child how they see fit.114
4. Constitutionality of Denominational Preferences
The religion clauses of the First Amendment state that “Congress
shall make no law [1] respecting an establishment of religion or [2]
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”115 The first clause, often referred to as the Establishment Clause, ensures that “[n]either a state
nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another.”116 The second clause, often referred to as the Free Exercise Clause, provides the “right to religious beliefs, including assem107. Id. at 413.
108. Mabry, supra note 98, at 39.
109. Wilder, It’s Really Not About Best Interests, supra note 54, at 418–19.
110. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–57 (1982) (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)).
111. Wilder, It’s Really Not About Best Interests, supra note 54, at 419.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 421.
114. See id.
115. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Fourteenth Amendment has made the First Amendment applicable to the states. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
116. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
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bling for worship services, proselytizing, and observing dietary
restrictions . . .”117 Thus, the Free Exercise Clause affords constitutional protection to beliefs, but not necessarily actions motivated by
those beliefs.118 The Free Exercise Clause forbids governmental interference with a parent’s decision to practice or not to practice religion,
as well as the parent’s choice of religion.119 However, if the government in fact interferes with fundamental constitutional rights of the
parent, that interference is subject to a strict scrutiny analysis.120 The
government’s interference will only be justified with a showing of a
compelling state interest.121
Under certain circumstances, courts may consider religion in divorce proceedings when custody is being determined.122 Assuming
that the parents are unable to agree or make decisions jointly, the
government may intervene on the otherwise protected sphere of parental decision-making.123 There are times when a custody determination requires the court to inquire into a parent’s religious beliefs. In
this case, a state court may consider: (1) “religion as one, but not the
sole factor;” (2) “the impact that religion will have on the child’s secular well-being;” or (3) “the child’s ascertainable preferences and
whether religion plays an important role in shaping the child’s
identity.”124
When a court investigates into a parent’s religion, the court should
refrain from focusing on the official doctrines of the religion.125 This
limitation is derived from the Free Exercise Clause, whereby a law
may not interfere with a person’s religious beliefs, but, in certain circumstances, it may interfere with the practices of those religious beliefs.126 Thus, in order for a court to honestly consider a parent’s
religion “for its secular worth” and survive strict scrutiny, the court
must identify the secular values pertinent in the court’s custody determination and require a factual showing that the religion does or does
117. Wilder, It’s Really Not About Best Interests, supra note 54, at 412.
118. Wilder, Religion and Best Interests, supra note 55, at 220.
119. See Mabry, supra note 98, at 39.
120. Wilder, It’s Really Not About Best Interests, supra note 54, at 418.
121. Note, The Establishment Clause and Religion in Child Custody Disputes: Factoring Religion into the Best Interest Equation, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1702, 1704 (1984) [hereinafter Factoring
Religion into the Best Interest Equation].
122. See Mabry, supra note 98, at 40.
123. Wilder, Religion and Best Interests, supra note 55, at 221.
124. Mabry, supra note 98, at 40–41.
125. See Factoring Religion into the Best Interest Equation, supra note 121, at 1705.
126. See generally Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); United States v. Lee,
455 U.S. 252 (1982); see Harris v. Harris, 343 So. 2d 762 (Miss. 1977).
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not embody those secular values.127 Thus, religious practices may be
considered by a court if it can be demonstrated that the practices impact the child’s best interests.128
a. Preference Between Two Different Religions
The Establishment Clause generally prohibits courts from determining custody between religious parents solely on the grounds of religion.129 Thus, a court’s preference for one religion over another
based on the doctrines they promote is a violation of the Establishment Clause.130 However, an exception to this general rule exists:
“[t]his preference is unconstitutional unless the religious practices involved threaten the child’s health or safety.”131 Additionally, courts
agree that in most cases, “the unconventionality or unpopularity of
the [parent]’s religion may not be considered” in a custody determination.132 Thus, even when a parent follows an unpopular or unconventional religion, traditional and nontraditional religions must be treated
alike.133
b. Preference Between Religion and Non-Religion
Courts have held that preference for religion over no religion is
equally as constitutionally impermissible as preferring one religion
over a different religion.134 The constitutionality of a court’s preference for religion over no religion is determined under the tripartite
test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman.135 The test set forth in Lemon
requires: (1) that the statute have a secular legislative purpose; (2)
that its principal or primary effect neither advance nor inhibit religion;
and (3) that the statute not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.136 A court’s preference for religious over nonreligious parents violates every part of the Lemon test: it serves a
religious purpose rather than a secular purpose, it has the principal
effect of advancing religion, and it entangles the state with religion in
127. Factoring Religion into the Best Interest Equation, supra note 121, at 1716.
128. See Wilder, Religion and Best Interests, supra note 55, at 225.
129. See Factoring Religion into the Best Interest Equation, supra note 121, at 1704.
130. See Wilder, Religion and Best Interests, supra note 55, at 229.
131. Factoring Religion into the Best Interest Equation, supra note 121, at 1716.
132. Id. at 1704 n.13.
133. See id. at 1704, 1717 n.50.
134. See, e.g., Welker v. Welker, 129 N.W.2d 134, 138 (Wis. 1964) (refusing to compare the
merits of religious attitudes during a custody determination between a religious parent and an
agnostic parent).
135. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
136. Id.
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such a way to violate the Establishment Clause.137 Moreover, freedom
of religion is not only the freedom to practice organized religion; it is
also the freedom to reject all religions.138 A court’s preference for a
religious parent over a nonreligious parent not only punishes the nonreligious parent for exercising a constitutionally protected right, but it
also places the court on the side of organized religion.139
c. Preference When Religion Threatens Health and Safety
It is clearly a constitutional violation for a court to prefer one religion over a different religion, or to prefer one religion over no religion.140 However, there is an exception to this general rule: a court may
exercise a preference when the religious practices of one parent
threaten a child’s health or safety.141 To make a preference, a court
must consider the respective religious practices of each parent. However, the court’s examination of the parents’ religious practices is limited to the direct impact that those practices have on the child.142
Courts face an ongoing struggle with these examinations; namely, to
what degree is the certainty and amount of harm to the child
shown?143
Courts seem to agree that a showing of harm must be more than
simply demonstrating that the child could be confused or upset by
conflicting religious practices, or that the child might be bored when
sitting in church for long periods of time.144 A religious parent will not
be denied custody “where the possibility of harm is speculative and
not immediate.”145 Rather, the only way a court may justify an intrusion on the parent’s right to expose their children to certain religious
beliefs is if actual harm is demonstrated.146 Hence, a state will have a
compelling interest sufficient to permit interference with parental
rights upon a finding that a parent’s actions cause threatened or actual
harm to the child.147
137. See Factoring Religion into the Best Interest Equation, supra note 121, at 1727.
138. See Wilder, It’s Really Not About Best Interests, supra note 54, at 419–20.
139. Id. at 420.
140. See supra Part I.B.4.a–b.
141. See Factoring Religion into the Best Interest Equation, supra note 121, at 1716; see Wilder,
Religion and Best Interests, supra note 55, at 220.
142. See id. at 1706 n.19.
143. See id. at 1705 n.18.
144. Wilder, Religion and Best Interests, supra note 55, at 222–23.
145. Id. at 225–26.
146. See Wilder, It’s Really Not About Best Interests, supra note 54, at 416.
147. See id. at 419.
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II. ANALYSIS
A. What Do Vaccinations Have to Do with the Best Interests
Standard?
In order to ensure government neutrality in matters involving religion, the First Amendment requires courts to stay out of controversies
involving religion and prohibits judges from inquiring into religion
during custody proceedings.148 Unless extenuating circumstances exist, the court may not include religion in its determination of a child’s
best interest.149 Seeing that a person’s right to the free exercise of religion is a fundamental constitutional right, governmental interference
is subject to a strict scrutiny analysis, whereby the interference must
be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.150
Not only do parents have the fundamental right to the free exercise
of religion, but they also have the fundamental right to the care and
custody of their children.151 These fundamental rights, when taken together, present a strong barrier against governmental interference.
However, there are circumstances that may warrant a court interfering into this sphere of protected parental decision-making. One instance that may justify a court’s interference is during a divorce
proceeding. Specifically, the court may justifiably interfere when two
parents are unable to agree on crucial decisions relating to their
child.152
Imagine this scenario: a couple is going through a divorce proceeding. The wife identifies as a Christian Scientist and thus opposes vaccinations.153 The husband does not identify with any religion and
believes that their child should in fact be vaccinated. In this situation,
the parents are clearly unable to make joint medical decisions relating
to their child; the wife strongly opposes vaccinations and would likely
seek a religious exemption when enrolling the child into school,
whereas the husband believes that the child should be vaccinated.
Here, in order to fully ascertain the best interests of the child, a court
may inquire into the religious beliefs of the parents.
When two parents who practice two different religions are involved
in a divorce proceeding, and the outcome of a custody judgment in148. See Factoring Religion into the Best Interest Equation, supra note 121, at 1725–26.
149. See id. at 1738.
150. See Wilder, It’s Really Not About Best Interests, supra note 54, at 418.
151. See generally id. at 413.
152. Wilder, Religion and Best Interests, supra note 55, at 221.
153. Antonia Blumberg, Here’s Where Major Religions Actually Stand On Vaccines, HUFF.
POST (Mar. 31, 2017, 5:47 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/heres-where-major-religions-ac
tually-stand-on-vaccines_n_58dc3ef0e4b08194e3b71fc4.
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volves the vaccination—or exemption from vaccinations—of a child, a
court may consider the parents’ religions if the religious practices
threaten the child’s health or safety. The court’s consideration of the
parents’ religions is of course limited to the direct impact that the religious practices have on the child.154 A court’s “judgment[ ] of religious merit [is] only justified by the compelling interest in protecting
children’s health and safety.”155
While there is no uniform standard for the amount of harm that
needs to be shown, courts seem to agree that a showing of harm must
be more than simply demonstrating that the child could be confused
or upset by conflicting religious practices, or that the child might be
bored when sitting in church for long periods of time.156 The only way
that a court may justify an intrusion on the parent’s right to expose
their children to certain religious beliefs is if actual harm is demonstrated.157 Courts have found that the religious practices of a parent
may endanger the health or safety of a child when the parent prohibits
medical treatment—such as a blood transfusion—because of his or
her religious beliefs.158
A court’s interference is far from unlimited. Rather,
“[i]nfringement is constitutionally permissible only upon a showing
that the restriction is necessary to promote a compelling state interest,
and that this interest is served in the least restrictive manner possible.”159 In making its determination, a court must balance individual
liberty (i.e., a parent’s right to raise their child) with police power (i.e.,
the state’s interest as parens patriae).160 Courts are charged with balancing the rights of individuals to choose whether or not to vaccinate
their children with the individual and societal risks associated with
claiming a religious exemption.161
Parents enjoy a constitutionally protected, fundamental right to
raise their child as they see fit, including making decisions regarding
the custody, control, and care of their child.162 However, the limitation
on a parent’s fundamental right to raise their child as they see fit
arises out of the state’s interest as parens patriae.163 As parens patriae,
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

See Factoring Religion into the Best Interest Equation, supra note 121, at 1706 n.19.
Id.
Wilder, Religion and Best Interests, supra note 55, at 222–23.
See Wilder, It’s Really Not About Best Interests, supra note 54, at 416.
Mabry, supra note 98, at 43.
Wilder, It’s Really Not About Best Interests, supra note 54, at 418.
Lu, supra note 12, at 872.
Salmon & Siegel, supra note 41, at 289.
See generally supra note 103 and accompanying text.
See Wilder, It’s Really Not About Best Interests, supra note 54, at 418–19.
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the state has a compelling interest in “safeguarding the physical and
psychological well-being of a minor.”164 Thus, parents may make all of
their own choices regarding the custody, control, and care of their
child without worrying about interference from the state. This remains
true unless a parent’s actions cause actual or threatened harm to their
child. In that instance, the state’s interest as parens patriae outweighs
the parent’s right to raise their child as they see fit.
While the state may not interfere simply because the two parents
are involved in a divorce proceeding, a showing during said proceeding—that a parent’s actions may cause or have caused actual or
threatened harm to the child—warrants interference by courts. Otherwise stated, the court’s finding of the child’s best interests will constitutionally support a custody decision that transgresses a parent’s
fundamental right to raise their child how they see fit if a parent’s
decision results in actual or threatened harm to the child.165
In the scenario at hand, one parent identifies herself as a Christian
Scientist and practices the teachings of Christian Science. Taken on its
face, there are no problems. She is free to follow and practice her
religion and she is allowed to pass the teachings of her religion along
to her children. However, the religion of Christian Science starkly opposes immunization and opposes the medical process of vaccinating
individuals, including children.166 As a result, this parent refuses to
vaccinate her children and intends to claim a religious exemption in
order to enroll her child in public school. If the child does not receive
his or her vaccines, the parent is not only exposing her child to numerous deadly diseases, but she is also exposing all other children and
adults who may come into contact with her child.167
Her decision not to vaccinate her child creates a threatened risk to
the child’s health and safety; in a divorce proceeding, the court has
been informed of this decision. At this point, the state’s interest as
parens patriae effectively creates a duty to interfere.168 Under normal
circumstances, a court may not substitute its judgment for the parent’s
judgment on the ground that a different choice might be better.169
However, this is not a normal circumstance; the parent’s decision
could result in her child contracting a lethal disease. Thus, a court may
assign legal custody to the other parent who does not oppose vaccina164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

See generally supra note 110.
See Wilder, It’s Really Not About Best Interests, supra note 54, at 421.
Blumberg, supra note 153.
Calandrillo, supra note 3, at 420.
See supra Part I.A.3.
Wilder, Religion and Best Interests, supra note 55, at 221.
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tions and wants his child to receive the proper vaccinations. Such an
action is supported by the state’s interest as parens patriae and outweighs the mother’s right to raise her child how she sees fit.
Not only does this action not violate the mother’s fundamental right
to raise her child as she sees fit, but this action also does not violate
her First Amendment rights under either the Establishment Clause or
the Free Exercise Clause. The Establishment Clause ensures that
“[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.”170 The court’s decision to award legal
custody to the parent who does not identify with any religion is the
exact outcome that the Establishment Clause intended for. Even if the
father identified with a certain religion, there is still no violation of the
Establishment Clause because preference for one religion over another is permissible when the practices of one of the religions followed
by a parent threatens the health and safety of their child.171 Next, the
Free Exercise Clause provides the “right to religious beliefs, including
assembling for worship services, proselytizing, and observing dietary
restrictions . . .”172 As a result, the Free Exercise Clause affords constitutional protection to beliefs, but not necessarily actions motivated
by those beliefs.173 In this scenario, the Free Exercise Clause protects
the mother’s right to follow and practice her religion, but it does not
grant her the right to expose her child or community to harm from
disease.174 Maintaining the good of the public as a whole justifies such
a limitation on the Free Exercise Clause. Therefore, a court’s decision
to award legal custody to the parent who does not identify with any
particular religion does not violate the mother’s First Amendment
rights.
B. Considering the Religions of Both Parents Satisfies All Three
Prongs of Lemon
A court’s consideration of each parents’ religion in custody determinations should be analyzed under the Lemon test.175 In Lemon, the
Supreme Court created a three-prong test, which the Court has subsequently used to determine the constitutionality of laws challenged
170. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
171. See Factoring Religion into the Best Interest Equation, supra note 121, at 1716; see also
Wilder, Religion and Best Interests, supra note 55, at 220.
172. Wilder, It’s Really Not About Best Interests, supra note 54, at 412.
173. See Wilder, Religion and Best Interests, supra note 55, at 220.
174. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167–70 (1944).
175. See generally Factoring Religion into the Best Interest Equation, supra note 121, at 1708.
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under the Establishment Clause.176 While Lemon focused primarily
on state statutes, judicial decisions may nevertheless be subject to the
scrutiny of the tripartite test.177 Thus, the test is used to determine
whether governmental action offends the Establishment Clause and
requires: “(1) that the action have a secular purpose, (2) that its principal or primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3)
that it does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.”178 If a
government action “fails” just one of the prongs, there will be a violation of the Establishment Clause.179 When two parents who practice
two different religions are involved in a divorce proceeding, and the
outcome involves the vaccination—or exemption from vaccinations—
of a child, a court’s consideration of the parents’ religion satisfies all
three prongs of the Lemon test and passes constitutional muster.
1. Secular Purpose
The first prong of the Lemon test is secular purpose: “[t]he government is required to have a secular purpose for its message or action.”180 While the purpose may in fact be self-serving, it will be
considered constitutional so long as it is secular.181 Of course, the
Court has found that certain actions have a preeminent purpose that is
religious in nature, which could never “blind [the Court] to that
fact.”182 At times, the majority of the Court has framed the finding of
a secular purpose in such a way that a religious purpose and a secular
purpose may not coexist without violating the Constitution.183 Other
times, the Court has “limited the purpose requirement to the express
wording of the Lemon test—that the government have ‘a’ secular purpose.”184 Such a limitation demonstrates the Court’s search for any
secular purpose.
Following this relaxed attitude, the Court has done away with serious investigations into the purpose of an action and no longer requires
that a secular purpose be preeminent.185 Following the standard as set
forth in Lemon, the simple requirement of having a secular purpose
176. Novak, supra note 4, at 1111.
177. See generally Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233 (Alaska 1979); Zucco v. Garrett, 501
N.E.2d 875 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
178. Zucco, 501 N.E.2d at 880.
179. See Amy J. Alexander, When Life Gives You the Lemon Test: An Overview of the Lemon
Test and Its Application, 3 PHOENIX L. REV. 641, 646 (2010).
180. Id. at 656.
181. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40 (1980).
182. Id. at 41.
183. But see id. at 44 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
184. Alexander, supra note 179, at 657.
185. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681–82 (1984).
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provides a much clearer approach for lower courts.186 So long as there
is a secular purpose, the action will satisfy the first prong. But if there
is not a secular purpose, the action will fail this prong.187 While the
court may be required to conduct a more thorough investigation into
the motives behind the governmental action, the requirement that the
secular purpose be legitimate is reinforced when taking this
approach.188
In this situation, when a court inquires into the parents’ religion in
making a custody determination, it is doing so for a secular purpose
and thus satisfies the first prong of the Lemon test. The reason that
the court must look into the religion of the parents is to understand
the relationship between religion and vaccinations. The question that
the court is presented with when analyzing this issue is whether or not
a child will be vaccinated. Vaccinations and immunizations are undoubtedly secular purposes, as the court is assessing behavior and decisions that directly affect the health and safety of the child.189
Under the Lemon test, a secular purpose exists because the court is
essentially just making the decision of whether or not the child will
receive the vaccines necessary to enroll in school. It is true that standing alone, the “religiousness” of a party is not a reliable guide to his or
her fitness as a parent.190 However, in this situation, religion alone is
not being weighed to determine the best interests of the child. The
analysis of religion is merely used as a means to an end. The end—
awarding legal custody to the parent who wants to vaccinate the
child—serves a secular purpose by protecting the health and safety of
that child, as well as all other individuals in that community. Therefore, the first prong of the Lemon test is satisfied.
2. Principal or Primary Effect Must Not Advance or Inhibit
Religion
The second prong of the Lemon test is effect, which requires that
the action not have the principal or primary effect of advancing or
inhibiting religion.191 Rather than focusing on the motivation behind
the action, the effect prong focuses on the result of the government
action.192 This prong, morphing since Lemon, saw its most significant
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

See id. at 681.
See Alexander, supra note 179, at 658.
See generally McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 902 (2005).
See Zucco v. Garrett, 501 N.E.2d 875, 880 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
See generally id.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
See generally id.
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change in Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly.193 In
her concurrence, Justice O’Connor introduced the “endorsement
test,” where the Court would ask whether the government’s message
endorses a religion as determined by the reasonably informed observer, rather than asking what effect actually occurred.194 Rather
than looking at the actual effect, Justice O’Connor’s version of the
prong requires the Court to examine the hypothetical effect of a government action based on social context.195 While this version provides
a clearer standard for the Court, its application has proven unworkable.196 This is due to the fact that analysis under the “endorsement
test” requires a highly fact-based analysis, which in turn reduces its
precedential value.197
The endorsement test has also altered the way that the Court looks
at the preeminence of the effect. Under the original Lemon test, in
order to hold that an action violated the Establishment Clause, the
effect of advancing religion must have been “primary” or “principal.”198 Following this language, the Court frequently found that “incidental benefits conferred on religion were acceptable as long as they
were not primary.”199 Under this approach, incidental benefits to religion will not invalidate a government’s action.200 However, the revised prong—incorporating Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test—
created a much stricter test. Under the endorsement version, if a hypothetical observer could confuse an incidental benefit to religion
with endorsement of religion, the government’s action could be held
to violate the Establishment Clause.201 Even if the purpose and primary effect of the action was secular, the action could still be considered unconstitutional if a hypothetical person views an incidental
benefit as the government favoring a religion.202 Justice O’Connor’s
193. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691–92 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
194. Id. at 691.
195. See generally id.
196. See generally Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573,
598–621 (1989) (evaluating context in detail to determine whether a creche and a menorah
would lead a reasonable observer to believe the government was favoring religion).
197. Alexander, supra note 179, at 659.
198. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
199. Alexander, supra note 179, at 660.
200. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673 (mandating accommodation, not just tolerance of all religions); see generally Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding state payment of chaplains praying at legislative sessions); see also Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 693 (1970)
(upholding tax exemption for church property).
201. See Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 768 (1995).
202. See Alexander, supra note 179, at 661.
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endorsement test with respect to the second prong has effectively lowered the threshold for invalidating a government action or message.203
In this situation, when a court inquires into the parents’ religion in
making a custody determination, the principal or primary effect is not
to advance religion and thus satisfies the second prong of the Lemon
test. When preference is given to parents who are actively involved in
organized religion, the effects are essentially to punish non-religious
parents who do not believe in God or going to church by making it
less likely that they will gain custody of their children; to encourage
non-religious, anti-religious, or simply disinterested parents to engage
in religious practices even if their beliefs are not sincere; and to increase the number of children raised in religious households.204
Under the original version of the Lemon test, there are no benefits
conferred upon any specific religion when the court considers the religion of both parents and there are no benefits conferred when the
court awards legal custody to the non-religious parent, rather than the
religious parent. Even when this issue is analyzed under Justice
O’Connor’s endorsement test, it still satisfies the second prong of the
Lemon test. Under Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test, a hypothetical person would have to view the incidental benefit as the government favoring religion.205 However, this is not possible under these
circumstances. The court’s decision to inquire into the religions of
both parents and award legal custody to the non-religious parent simply cannot be viewed as the government favoring religion. In fact, the
court’s decision actually disfavors religion and makes a preference for
non-religion over religion, which is precisely the type of outcome that
the First Amendment intended. Therefore, the second prong of the
Lemon test is satisfied.
3. Excessive Government Entanglement
The third prong of the Lemon test is entanglement, which prohibits
the government from acting in a manner that would excessively entangle the government with religion.206 In Lemon, the Court defined excessive entanglement as “ ‘comprehensive, discriminating, and
continuing state surveillance’ or action potentially igniting controversy.”207 This definition of “excessive entanglement” has proven to
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

See id.
See Zucco v. Garrett, 501 N.E.2d 875, 881 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691–92 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
Alexander, supra note 179, at 662 (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619).
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be “broad enough to allow courts to interpret the prong in a variety of
ways.”208
A prime example of how the entanglement prong could be construed differently by different Justices was in Aguilar v. Felton, where
the Court used the entanglement prong to strike down a state remedial program.209 The program involved public teachers going to parochial schools to teach and perform administrative duties.210 Despite
the fact that the subjects taught at the school were secular and the
environment within the school would be secularized, the Court nevertheless found an excessive entanglement between government and religion.211 In Chief Justice Burger’s dissent, he expressed his fear that
the majority was “obsessed” with the Lemon test and as a result, the
Court’s opinions were actually contrary to the country’s interests.212
In Justice O’Connor’s dissent, she fervently disagreed with the majority’s application of the entanglement prong, expressing that she
“would not invalidate [a statute] merely because it requires some
ongoing cooperation between church and state or some state supervision . . .”213
In this situation, when a court inquires into the parents’ religion in
making a custody determination, it is not creating an excessive entanglement between government and religion and thus satisfies the third
prong of the Lemon test. The third prong is arguably the most controversial and the most difficult to ascertain how Justices would rule.214 It
is possible to argue that taking religion into consideration, even as a
means to an end, is sufficient entanglement between government and
religion. However, similar to Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Aguilar, a
court’s inquiry into a parent’s religion should not be held unconstitutional for merely acting as a means to an end, especially when public
health is an interest closely related to that “end” (i.e., whether or not a
child will be vaccinated).
Following the Supreme Court’s holding that the Free Exercise
Clause does not grant a parent the right to expose their children or the
community to harm from disease,215 states have similarly held that
208. See id.
209. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 412–13 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S.
203 (1997).
210. See id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 419 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 430 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
214. See generally id. at 419 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), 420–21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting),
429–30 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
215. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944).
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states have an “overriding and compelling public interest” to protect
children from harm, even when such rights conflict with the religious
rights of parents.216 In theory, this scenario should produce a similar
result. While there may be some type of entanglement between government and religion, the entanglement certainly cannot be considered excessive. Additionally, public health and safety, as well as the
health and safety of that specific child, outweigh the court’s inquiry
into the parents’ religion. Therefore, the third prong of the Lemon
test is satisfied.
III. IMPACT
With custody determinations lying in the hands of judges, the possibility that a court may award decision-making to the parent who opposes vaccinations—in this scenario, the mother—is a legitimate one.
There are a number of reasons why a court may favor the wife over
the husband in these situations. For instance, courts have justified considering a parent’s religion when the religion is said to promote the
child’s “spiritual welfare,” or to promote the child’s temporal wellbeing.217 In promoting the child’s temporal well-being, many courts
refer to the “supposed causal connection between a parent’s religion
and her morality, or more generally, between a parent’s religion and a
good home life for the child[,]” thereby linking religion to valid secular concerns (i.e., the moral and ethical beliefs of parents and the effects these beliefs will have on the child).218 Despite the fact that the
Supreme Court has stated that a person without a traditional religious
affiliation may have just as strong of a moral code as a person with
such traditional beliefs,219 trial courts can and will continue to award
custody to religious parents.
There is no dispute that custody determinations are extremely fact
determinative and that judges make their decisions on a case-by-case
basis. But most often, the facts that determine the outcome are limited
to the parents and the child in that specific case. The scope of the case
is extremely limited, and societal factors are often excluded from the
decision-making process. In the majority of cases, this is justified; the
future is uncertain, and judges cannot predict the effect of one custody
judgment on the rest of society. However, when vaccinations and potential exemptions are involved, the court must consider third parties
and outside groups. While consideration of third parties who are un216.
217.
218.
219.

See Brown v. Stone, 378 So. 2d 218, 222 (Miss. 1979); Silverman, supra note 60, at 283.
Factoring Religion into the Best Interest Equation, supra note 121, at 1709.
See id. at 1709–10.
See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970).
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likely to experience a direct effect from such a decision seems burdensome and too far removed, serious problems may arise if every judge
making this decision believes that it is “just this one time” and “just
this one case.”
Arguably one of the most important communal aspects of compulsory vaccination requirements is the establishment of herd immunity.
When a significant percentage of individuals are vaccinated, it is possible that others may not need to be vaccinated.220 Serving as a protective barrier, herd immunity makes it safe for a minority of individuals
who may be unable to receive vaccinations, due to age- and healthrelated concerns.221 While herd immunity can occur even when less
than one hundred percent of the population is vaccinated, there is
very little room for error. In fact, in order for the transmission of the
disease to be interrupted, a significantly high proportion of the population must be immunized.222 When individuals who do not receive
vaccinations rely on the rest of the “herd” to keep them safe,
problems arise, and not just for those individuals who opt out.
“Rather, the safety of the entire community is jeopardized when overall immunization rates fall below a critical threshold.”223 The protective barrier created by herd immunity creates a lethal collective action
problem, which exists when “individuals can gain more by not contributing to the public good[,] but instead ‘free riding’ on the contributions of others.”224
When a judge believes that their decision is “just this one time” or
“just this one case,” he or she is contributing to, and exacerbating, the
collective action problem. Operating under the assumption that “if
everyone else is protected, then so is this child” undermines society’s
ability to achieve a critical mass of people who are vaccinated.225
If a court were to award legal custody to the religious parent, it
would result in yet another unimmunized child. The problem arises
when the reaction is “So what if there is another unimmunized child?
It’s only one person.” because it is not just one person. In fact, the
number of children in the United States under the age of two who are
completely unvaccinated has been on a steady incline over the last
220. Calandrillo, supra note 3, at 420.
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. Id. at 419.
224. See generally Robb Willer, Groups Reward Individual Sacrifice: The Status Solution to the
Collective Action Problem, 74 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 23 (2009).
225. Calandrillo, supra note 3, at 361.
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decade.226 In 2001, the proportion of children who received no vaccine
doses by age 24 months was 0.3%.227 In 2011, the proportion gradually
increased to 0.9% and in 2015, the proportion increased to 1.3%.228
Additionally, the Center for Disease Control has reported that of the
2.2% of kindergarteners nationwide claiming an exemption, 2.0% of
those exemptions were non-medical (i.e., religious or philosophical/
personal belief exemptions).229 While immunization rates remain high
at national and state levels, county-level data has demonstrated alarmingly high exemption rates in some rural locations.230 Some of these
communities have seen vaccine coverage fall below 90–95%, making
herd immunity meaningless.231
While courts may disregard society and third parties entirely when
making routine custody determinations, excluding societal factors
when a child’s vaccination is at issue may produce a potentially fatal
result. By awarding legal custody to the parent whose religion opposes
vaccinations, a court is essentially promoting the use of exemptions
and, thus, contributing to the downfall of herd immunity. Therefore, it
is of the utmost importance for courts to take the negative externality
costs into account when making a custody determination, since the
determination is actually whether or not a child will be immunized.
IV. CONCLUSION
There is no question that the best interests standard is a dominant
force in child custody determinations. While courts should be cognizant of the First Amendment and a parent’s right to raise their child as
they see fit, the narrow situation set forth in this Article should be at
the forefront of a judge’s mind. Not only does the judge’s decision
affect the immediate parties, but making the wrong decision could
contribute to the collective action problem by decreasing herd immunity and exposing other children—and even adults—to potentially fa226. See Holly A. Hill et al., Vaccination Coverage Among Children Aged 19–35 Months —
United States, 2017, 67 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY REP. 1123, 1123 (2018), available at
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/67/wr/mm6740a4.htm?s_cid=MM6740a4_e.
227. Id. at 1127.
228. Id. at 1123.
229. See Jenelle L. Mellerson et al., Vaccination Coverage for Selected Vaccines and Exemption Rates Among Children in Kindergarten — United States, 2017–18 School Year, 67 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY REP. 1115, 1116 (2018), available at https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/
volumes/67/wr/mm6740a3.htm?s_cid=MM6740a3_e.
230. See Lena H. Sun, Kids in these U.S. hot spots at higher risk because parents opt out of
vaccinations, WASH. POST (June 20, 2018, 1:37 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/toyour-health/wp/2018/06/12/kids-in-these-u-s-hotspots-at-higher-risk-because-parents-opt-out-ofvaccinations/?noredirect=ON.
231. See id.
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tal diseases. As the anti-vaccination movement continues to gain
force, courts must take societal factors into account when making a
child custody determination between two parents with different religions, one that supports and one that opposes vaccinations. In such a
case, awarding legal custody to the parent who supports vaccinations
is the best possible outcome in order to maintain public health and
safety.
Gabrielle N. Kahn

